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TALIS1
CODE NAPOLEON OR CODE POR
.ALAIN LEVASSEUR*

[On the o ccasion of the 200th birthday of Napoleo"!, the
Tulane Law Review presents an important and previously
untranslated document. The Preliminary Discourse of Port
alis here trans1ated by Shael Herman, was addressed to the
Fr�nch National Assembly in 1800, and is perhaps the most
significant of all the writings preceding the enactment of the
Co de Napoleon. Its importance is demonstrated by the fol
lowing article by Professor Levasseur. Its relevance �o. the
current debate concerning a new Civil Code for Loui�iana
should be obvious to the readers of the Tulane Law Review.]
INTRODUCTION
Tradition and habit would seem to condemn such a question,
i.e., Code Napoleon or Code Portalis, to an inevitable answer. How
ever, despite appearance, the answer is not easy to give. Each ele
ment of the alternative question has merit and weight. On one side
we have prestige and greatness acquired largely with military

genius; on the other side we have glory and fame acquir ed by
talent of rhetoric, method and compromise. Where Bonaparte,
the soldier and the military genius, needed officers such as Ney,
Murat, and Lannes, Bonaparte, the head of state, needed faithful
and able servants to add laurels to his crown. His greatness lay in
his wise choices. Justinian had selected Tribonian as the head of the
commission appointed to write what was to be the Digest; Napoleon
chose Portalis to fulfill the same obligations. They complemented
each other very well: one conceived what the other implemented;
the former would not have had his name attached to the Civil
Code, had the latter lost his life in the horrors and injustices of
the Revolution. We feel it is our duty, theref o re, t o relate briefly
the genesis of the Code before it can be shown that the fame and
fate of the work were due to the exceptional legal mind and
creative genius of Portalis.

THE GENESIS OF THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE (OR CODE NAPOLEON) OF
18041
T e idea of u�ifying the civil laws,
aiming essentially at sup
.
pressing the unag
mary line dividing the French territory into "pays
de coutume" and "pays de droit ecrit,"
had, long before Napoleon,
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been one of the main concerns of the monarchy. The national evolu
tion, stimulated by good sense and practical reason, seemed to
suggest the natural tendency towards unification. With the improve
ments in communications, i t became absurd to pass from the domain
of one law to that of another every time it was necessary to change
horses, as Voltaire noticed in a sarcastic remark. Men had come t o
the point where they felt, t hought, acted and worked in exactly the
same way; they came to wish to breathe the same law under the
same sun, feel the same rules on the same land, live the same social
and moral principles under the same leadership. Would it be, then,
a voluminous "coutumier"2 or a modern re-enactment of Roman
Law? Wishes were expressed, but circumstances would decide.
They could not decide, however, in any other way than that which
is inherent in the nature of the Frenchmen and characteristic of the
French nation: that of elaborating a compromise. The unification
would be made by a compromise between the "customs" of the
North and the "written law" of the South, or it would not be!
. The "grandes ordonnances" of Louis XIV and Louis XV3 paved
the way, set the example and taught the method. The commissions
created by Colbert (and often headed by Louis XIV) served as a
model to those later appointed by Napoleon, and the official tran
scripts of the former constituted precedents to the latter. The main
principles of Domat's work4 had been adopted and understood by
these a rtisans of the first hour, to the point that one can say they
drafted the grammar of the legislator's art. The first national
assembly during the Revolution, the Constituent Assembly,11 adopted
by unanimous vote in September, 1791, the resolution that a Code
should be drafted. The passage of time caused the promises of the
Constituent Assembly and the Legislative Assembly6 to be forgotten
until the Convention appointed a committee and ordered it to draft
a Civil Code in one month! Cambaceres,7 the president of the com
mittee, had the impossible task of elaborating a permanent civil
code in sympathy with the views of the constantly changing majority
of the assemblies, whether under the Convention or the Directory.
2 An accumulation of the usages, customs and mores of a territory.
a These ordonnances were often referred to as "Codes." See, e.g., Ordon

nance of 1667 on civil procedure (familiarly known as the Code Louis) i
Ordonnance of 1670 on criminal procedure (called Criminal Code); Ordonnance
of 1673 o n commerce (often called Code Savary).
4 J. Domat, Les lois civiles dans leur ordre nature!
5 The Constituent Assembly governed from June

30, 1791.

(1690-1697).
17, 1789, to September

6 The Legislative Assembly governed from September 30, 1791, to Sep
tember 21, 1792.
7 Cambaceres (1753-1824) wrote three projets of civil code; the first in
1793, the second in 1794, the third in 1798.
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le still exp ecte d, but with in
At the end of 1799, the Fre nch peop
promised and always deferred.
creasing impatience, the Cod e always
tious and conquerii:ig,
It is then that a single m a n stood, ambi
R�v�lution, to re�1ve
against the destructive force s of the dying
la1mmg the Const�tu
the spirit and the glow of the first days. Proc
1799, the First
tion of the Consulate, on the 15th day of December,
on the sacred
Consul told the Nation: "the Constitution is based
the evol�
rights of property, equality and liberty.... Citize ns,
d it. It is
tion is stabilized according t o the principles that starte
the feeling
finished." Napoleon's genius was that he interp reted
was
of the greatest majority of the French people and his glory
legend
The
that, having made a promise, h e fulfilled it complet ely.
n's
was born, then, that the whole civil code came out of Napoleo
of
mind, following the mytholog ical image of Minerva' s birth out
sis
Jupiter's brain. This legend is really but a legend. A careful analy
of the law laid down in the code, a glance back on the history of
its drafting, show very plainly that almost all of its content had
been inherited from the past (pre-revolutionary French law) or

�

received from the previous eve (law of the Revolution). Napoleon's
merit was to learn the art of making a law as h e learned the art
of fighting a war: by practising them. The First Consul presided
over the meetings of the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat) , as
General Bonaparte commanded his army on the battlefield: he
could see the victory, he could evaluate his means, and he could
adapt the latter to achieve the former. The means at his disposal
consisted in a handful of prominent jurists, scions of the noble
traditions of the French Parliaments.s On August 13, 1800, the
First Consul appointed a commission of four members to prepare
the draft of a new civil code. The members of the commission, thes e
artisans of the last hour, these faithful workers of a tremendous
monument, labored constantly under the supervision of Bonaparte,
w ose intelligence insatiable of preciseness, whose g enius imbued
with realism, forced them to create a code commens urate with the
glory of an Emperor. Napoleon, while in exile would then be en
titled to say : "My true glory is not that I h ve won 40 battles;
Waterloo will blow away the memory of these victories. What
nothing can blow away, what will live eternally, is
m y Civil Code."
The members of the commission never claimed
they intended to
act as. creators; they were disciples but not proph
ets, jurists but
not witch-lawyers! The First Consul of the Repu
blic appointed
T �onchet who was then President of the Tribu
of Cassa tion;
nal
�
B1got-Prea meneu, governmen t commissioner
in that Tribunal· Mal
leville, a judge at the Tribunal of Cassation;
and Portalis, g vern-

�

�

�

.

8 These Parliam�nts, under the monar
chy, had judicial functions political
'

rights, nnd also a wide power of administration.
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The

wisdom,

the

experience, and the scholarship of these men led them to understand
tha t their historical responsibility was to operate a smooth transi
tion between the present and the past, so that the Civil Code would
remai n for the people the French Revolution organized.
PORTALIS
Among all of the jurists who contributed to the drafting of the
Code, Portalis played the leading role. He was of those men whom
history made great because they were humble and modest, qualities
tha t human memory forgets easily where it can grasp others more
readily. Portalis can be compared to these prominent figures of
antique Rome whose names Cicero has immortalized, the Publius
Scaevola, the Quintus Mucius . . . 10
P ortalis was born in 1 746,11 of a father who was a professor of
canon law at the University of Aix-en-Provence. While in college a t
t h e Oratorians, h e exhibited an unusual ability t o speak in public
and a precocious maturity of judgment. At the age of 19, he became
a lawyer at the Parliament of Aix, where his method of pleading
practically revolutionized court procedure. Thibaudeau12 tells us
that after his first pleading, an old colleague of his went to him and
sa id, "You have pleaded with great effectiven ess; but you must
change your method which is not that of the bar." "Sir," Portalis
proudly answered, "it is the method of the bar that needs to be
changed, not me ."
I n 1770, although Portalis was only 24, the Prime Minister, the
Duke of Choiseul, asked him for a "consultation sur la validite des
mariages des Protestants." This consultation had such an impact on
the ideas of the time that Voltaire could write that it "was not a
consultation but a real treatise of philosophy, legislation and
polit ical morals."13 In two subsequent works14 he expressed ideas
and thoughts opposed to the necessity for uniform laws, uniformity
of legislation being one of the main instruments leading towards
despotism. For several years he would raise strong doubts about the
o 1 P. Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux prepnratoires du Code civil lzii

(1827).

10 Publius
Scaevola is mentioned in Cicero's Digest. Quintus Mucius is
mentioned in Cicero's De Oratore, De amicitia, De Republica.
11 At Bausset, near Toulon.
12 Thibaudeau Memoires s u r le Consulat par un ancien conseiller d'etat
de 1799 a 1804 at 414 (See Capitant, Portalis, le Pere du Code Civi� 66 Rev.
crit. leg. jur. 187, 189 n.1 (1936).
.
.
. .
.
1a
Discours , rapports et travaux med1ts sur le C�e C1v1l, published by
the Vicomte Frederic Portalis ( Portalis' grandson) Parts 1845.
Proven ce au Garde des Sceaux"
u "Lettre des Avocats d u Parlement de
(1788).
Edits"
nouveaux
des
l
(1788); "Examen impartia
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feasibility of a code. He could not foresee then the strong a� d

heroic hand, the all-powerful sword under which he would work in

peace during the Consulate, at the head of the group of the Elders.
During the horrible year s of the French Revolution he was sent
to prison and might have been sentenced to death had not his son
managed to save him. Elected to the Conseil des Anciens under the
Directory, Bonaparte noticed him and later Napoleon appointed
him, in April 1800, commissioner in the Prize Council and a few
months later Conseiller d'Etat (member of the Council of State)·
At the time of this last appointment, Portalis w a s already completely
blind. A cataract had woven its black veil over his eyes. The loss of
his sight in no way affected the intellectual qualities of the man.
His wonderful memory15 served him as a substitute for sight, and
France would owe to a blind man one of the greatest of her con
tributions to the world: the Civil Code. When one reads Portalis
one cannot but be stricken b y his method, by his style, quite similar
to the traditions of the rhetoricians of Antiquity. 16 His memory is
filled with maxims, definitions and precepts of moral science and
political science. "He [Montesquieu] taught u s not to separate de
tails from the whole, he taught us to study the laws in history,
which is like the applied physics of the legislative science."17 Good
faith and common sense are the two most important philosophical
features of Portalis' personality; he was definitely the most learned,
the wisest and the deepest of the members of the Commission.
Educated and brought up in the South of France, versed in the
knowledge of Roman Law, taught to respect the written law,
Portalis wanted very much for the Roman tradition to be adopted,
but his wisdom and his belief in the greatness of his responsibility
led him, quite naturally, to work towards a compromise with
Tronchet, the defender of customary law of northern France.
Portalis' leading role in the drafting of the French Civil Code
was acknowledged by his colleagues in the Commission who en

t

tru�ted him with the task of writing the general report on he works

achiev�d by the Commission, to bring to light the spirit that inspired
a�d g� ided the drafters. His previous works, his philosophical mind,

his wide knowledge, everything marked him out for this task. He
called
is �eport " relimi�ary discourse on the projet of Civil
,,1
.
This prehmmary
Code..
discourse is a masterpiece of legal science
and rightfully considered as such.

�

�: �ee �:

�

in te-Be uv�, Portalis, 5 Causeries
du lundi 441 et seq. (1852).
ee
� trans 1 ation of the Preliminary Discourse,
infra.
S ee S ainte-Beuve, supra note
15 , a t 462.
.
18 capi•ta n t' p
ortalis, le Pere du Code Civil, 56 Rev. cri leg. jur. 187
t.

17

( 1936).
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PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE19
NATURE

OF

THE LAw20

Good civil legislation is the greatest asset that men can give and
receive; it is the source o f morals, the safeguard of property, and
the guarantor of peace, both public and private; while it does not
establish the government, it maintains it; it restrains power and
contributes to its respect, as if the power were justice itself. Every
person is affected by legislation, for it intertw ines with the prin
cipal a ctivities of his life, and follows him everywhere; it often
constitutes the only morality of a nation and is al ways connected
with its freedom; finally, it comforts every citizen for sacrifices
that political necessity requires him to make for the community by
protecting him when necessary in both his person and property, as
if he alone were the entire community.
. . . But what a task it is to draft civil legislation for a great
people! The work would exceed human strength, if it involved giv
ing this people an absolutely new institution, and if, forgetting i t
occupies the highest rank among civilized nations, we chose t o
ignore the experience o f t h e past and the t radition of common
sense, rules, and maxims which has come down to us and embodies
the s pirit of centuries.
Legislation is not a pure act of power; it is an act of wisdom,
justice, and reason. The legislator does not exercise authority as
much as he serves a sacred office. He must not forget that legisla
tion is made for men, and that men are not made for legislation ;
that it should be adapted to the character, habits, and position o f
the people for whom it is made; that caution about novelty in
legislative matters is necessary because, while it is possible in a new
unde rtaking to calculate the advantages a theory offers, it is im 
possi ble to anticipate all the drawbacks that practice alone can
reveal; that one must leave what is good alone if one is in doubt
about what is better; tha t in correcting an abuse, the dangers in
herent in the correction itself must be reckoned with; that it would
be absurd to surrender oneself to a belief in absolute perfection in
matters susceptible of only relative goodness; that instead of chang
ing the laws, it is almost always more useful to give the citizens new

T ranslated by M. Shael Herman.
The headings do not appear in the original text. Because we hnvc trnns
latcd only excerpts from the speech, thr hcndings hnve been nddcd to guide
the reader's attention.
Several short selections from this Discourse have previously appeared. S1�.
10

20

e.g., A. Von Mehren,

The

Civil Law

System 57.59 (1957).
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grounds for liking them; that history offers us the promulgation of
scarcely more than two or three good laws in the space of several
centuries; that finally, it is proper to propose char:ges only to those
.
whose destiny it is to grasp, by a stroke of genius and a kind
of

sudden insight, the whole organization of a state.21
THE DYNAMISM OF THE LAW

�

be n �
...At the beginning of our discussions, we could not help
g a c1v1l
surprised by the opinion, s o widely held, that in draftin
and
code, a few precise provisions on each subject would suffice
everythat the great art is to simplify everything while foreseeing
thing.

To simplify everything is an undertaking on the meaning of
which we would all have to agree. To anticipate everythin g is a
goal impossible of attainment.
There must be no useless laws; they would weaken those which
are necessary and compromise the certainty and majesty of the
legislation
.

...The laws of the Twelve Tables are constantly proposed as
models; but can we compare the institutions of a nation just being
born with those of a nation that has already reached the pinnacle of
wealth and civilization? Didn't Rome, born to greatness and des
tined, so to speak , to be the eternal city, quickly recognize the
insufficiency of her original laws? Didn't the changes which had
gradually taken place in her mores provoke a c hange in her legisla
tion'? ... The history of Roman legal development is very much
that of all nations.
In despotic states, where the prince owns all the land, where all
commerce is carried on in the name of the head of state and for his
benefit, where individuals have neither liberty, nor free will, nor
property, there are more judges and hangmen than there are laws;
but wherever citizens have property to preserve and defend,
wherever they have political and civil rights, wherever honor counts
for something, a proper number of laws are needed to encompass
everything. The various kinds of goods, the various kinds of in
dustry, the various predicaments of human Iife demand different
rules. The concern of the lawmaker must be divided in proportion
to the multiplicity and importance of the matters which require
legislation. As a consequence, we find in the codes of civilized na21 This passage is
believed to be a flattering reference to Napoleon. See
A. Esme in, 1 L'Originalite du Code Civil 6 (1904).

1969]

769

CODE PORTALIS

tions the kind of meticulous attention which covers a multiplicity
of particular issues and seems to make an art of reason itself.
Thus, we did not think we should simplify the laws to the
point of leaving citizens without rule or guarantee concerning their
greatest interests.
We also kept clear of the dangerous ambition of wanting t o
forecast and regulate everything. Who would imagine that those t o
whom a code always seems too voluminous are the very people who
dare imperiously to assign the lawmaker the arduous task of leaving
nothing to the discretion of the judge?
No matter what we do, positive laws could never entirely replace
the use of natural reason in the affairs of life. Society's needs are
so varied, the intercourse between men so active, their interests so
manifold, and their relations so extensive that the legislator canno t
possibly provide for all eventualities.
In the very matters that particularly call for his attention,
there is a host of details which either escape him or are too much
open t o contention or instability to become the subject of a legal
provision.
In any case, how can one fetter the movement of time? How can
one r e sist the course of events or the steady pressure of customs?
How can one know and calculate in advance what only experience
can r eveal? Can a forecast ever encompass matters that thought
cannot reach?

A code, however complete it may seem, is hardly finished before
a

thousand unexpected issues come to face the judge. For laws,

once drafted, remain as they were written. Men, on the contrary,
are never at rest; they are constantly active, and their unceasing
activities, the effects of which are modified in many ways by cir
cumstances, produce at e ach instant some new combination, some
new fact, some new result.

A host of things is thus necessarily left to the province of cus
tom, the discussion of learned men, and the decision of judges.
The role of legislation is to set, by taking a broad approach. the
general propositions of the law, to establish principles which will be
fertile in application, and not to get down to the details of questions
which may arise in particular instances.
It is for the judge and the jurist, imbued with

the general spirit

of the laws, to direct their application.

Hence, in all civilized nations, we always witness the formation,
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and under the legislat ?r's
alongside the temple of enacted laws
decisions, and doctrm�l
supervision of a repo sitor y of maxims,
ers and t e1r
hich is daily refin ed by the prac tition
writings
s as all acquired
clashing debates in court, which steadily grow
ys been regarded as
knowledge is added to it, and which has alwa

w'

�

the true supplement of legislation.

We reproach those who expound jurisprudence for having multi
plied subtleties, compilations, and commentaries. This reproach
may have merit. But in what art or science is one not exposed t o
such a reproach? Should w e accuse a particular class of men o f
something which is only a general disease o f the human mind?
There are times when we are condemned to ignorance because we
lack books; there are others when it is hard t o learn because we
have too many of them.
. . . Undoubtedly, it would be desirable that all matters be regu
lated by legislation.
But if there is no precise provision on a particular matter, then
an ancient custom, constant and well established, an unbroken line
of similar decisions, an opinion, or an accepted maxim takes the
place of enacted law. When we are guided by nothing which i s
established or known, when what is involved is a n absolutely new
occurrence, we go back to principles of natural law. For if the law
maker's foresight is limited, nature is infinite; she applies to all
things that concern men.
All this presumes compilations, collections, treatises, and nu
merous volumes of research and analysis.
Some say the people, trapped in this labyrinth, cannot discern
what they must avoid or what they must do t o attain security for
their possessions and rights.
But would even the simplest code be within the grasp of all
classes of society? Wouldn't passions constantly be busying them
selves with distorting its true meaning? Is not a certain amount of

experie!1ce ne�ded wisely to apply the laws? In any event, where i s

the nation which has found a small number of simple laws sufficient
for very long?
It would thus be erroneous to think that there could be a body of
·
laws that would provide in advance for all possible c ases and yet at
the same time would be within the grasp of the humblest citizen.
In the present state of our societies, it is very fortunate that
the study of case law is a science that attracts t alent, enhances
self-respect, and awakens emulation. A whole class of men then
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dedicates itself to this science; and this class, devoted to the study o f
the laws, supplies advice and defenders to citizens unable to manage
their affairs or to def end themselves, and becomes like a seminary
for the judiciary.
It is very fortunate that we have compendia, and a constant
tradition of customs, maxims and rules so that i t becomes necessary,
in some way, to judge today much as we judged yesterday, and that
there be no variations between judicial decisions other than those
resulting from the progress of enlightenment and the force of cir
cumstances.
It is very fortunate that the judge's need to learn, to do re
search, and closely to examine the questions presented to him neve r
permits him to forget that, while there are t h ings within his dis
cretion , there are none which are entirely up to his caprice or whim.
In Turkey, where deciding cases is not art at all, where the
pasha can decide as he wishes whenever higher orders are not in his
way, we see the parties ask and receive justice only in fear. Why
don't we have the same anxieties before our judges? It is because
they are well-versed in their craft, are enlightened and learned, and
believe themselves under a constant duty to rely upon the enlighten
men t and learning of others. One can hardly r ealize how much this
scientific and rational practice mitigates and controls power.
METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

. . . There are two types of interpretation: one by way of doc
trinal theory, and the other by way of authority.
Interpretation by way of doctrine consists in grasping the true
sense of the laws, applying them in a discerning fashion, and sup
p lementing them in those cases which the laws have not provided
for. Without this kind of interpretation could we think of fulfilling
the judge's function?
Interpretation by way of authority consists in resolving ques
tions and doubts by means of regulations
dispositions

(dispositions generales)

•22

(reglemens) or general

This last means of inter

pretation is the only one forbidden to the judge.
When the legislation is clear, it must be followed; when it i s
obscure, we must carefully analyze its provisions. I f there is no par
ticular enactment, custom or equity must be consulted. Equity is the
return to natural law, when positive laws are silent, contradictory,
or obscure.
22 Reglements are rules having a limited scope and application. Dispositions
generales are governmental bills of broad scope and ap plication. [Translator's

foot not e.]
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ect not regulate?
... Parties who deal with each other on a subj
or to uni
by positive law submit themselves to received customs,
s. No�, to
versal principles of equity in the absence of any cus�om
it to a private
make a finding on a point of custom and then apply
application of
dispu te is a judicial act, not a legislative one. The
con
this equity or case-by-case justice which considers and must
bind one
sider, in each particular case, all the little thread s which .
for he
litigant to the other can never be in the legislator's domam,
with
is uniquely the minister of this justice or general equity, that

univer
out regard to any particular circumstance, e mbraces the
te
sality of persons and things. Legislation that intervened in priva
ty;
affairs would then often b e suspected of resulting from partiali
it would always be retroactive and unjust for those whose lawsuits
were instituted before its enactment.
Besides, recourse to the legislator would involve fatal delays to
the parties; and, what is worse, it would jeopardize the wisdom and
sanctity of the legislation.
In effect, legislation governs everyone; i t considers men en
masse, never as individuals; it must not interfere in individual
matters or lawsuits where citizens are pitted against one another.
Were the situation otherwise, it would be necessary to enact new
laws daily; their number would stunt their dignity and hinder their
observance. Magistrates would lose their function, and the law
maker, fettered by details, would soon be nothing more than a
magistrate. Individual interests would besiege legislative power;
at each instant, they would divert its attention from society's gen
ral interests.
There is a science for lawmakers, as there is for judges; and
the former does not resemble the latter. The legislator's science
consists in finding in each subject the principles most favorable t o
the common good; the judge's science is to put these principles into
effect, to diversify them, and to extend them, by means of wise and
reasoned application, to private causes· to examine closely the
spirit of the la� when the letter kills; and not t o expose himself to
.
the risk
of bemg alternately slave and rebel, and of disobeying
because of a servile mentality.
The legislator must pay attention to case law; it can enlighten
.
him, and he can �orrect it; but there must be a body of case law.
In �he �ost of subJects that make up civil matters, the judgments of
�h1ch, m most c�ses,. require less an application of a precise provi
sion than a combm.a�ion ?f several provisions leading to the decision
rather than contammg it, one cannot dispense with case law any
more than he can dispense with legislation. It is to judicial decision
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that we surrender the rare and extraordinary cases incapable of
fitting into a mold of rational legislation, the details so varied and
so much disputed that they should not concern the lawmaker at all,
and all the issues that one would try vainly to anticipate or that
a hasty prediction could not safely provide for. It is for experience
gradually to fill up the gaps we leave. The Codes of nations are the
fruit of the passage of time; but properly speaking, we do not
make them.
NATURAL

LAW AND POSITIVE LAW

Law (Droit) is universal reason, supreme reason based upon
the very nature of things. Legislation (lois) is o r should be no more
than law reduced to positive rules and individual precepts. Law is
morally obligatory; but by itself, it does not involve any constraints;
law guides, legislation commands; law serves as a navigator's
compass, and legislation as a geometer's compass.23
Nations live among themselves only beneath the authority of
law. Members of each community are ruled as men by law, and, as
citizens, by legislation.
Natural law and the law of nations (ius gentium) do not differ
in terms of substance, only in terms of their application. Reason,
insofar as it governs all men, is called natural l aw, and this reason
is called the law of nations (ius gentium) when applied to relations
of one p eople with another.
When we speak of a natural law of nations and a positive law of
nations, it is to distinguish eternal principles of justice, which
nations have not created but which dominate them like the humblest
of men, from conventions, treaties, and customs that are the work
of nations.
. . . We have determined the various effects of legislation. It
permits or defends; it orders, establishes, corrects, punishes or
rewards. It obliges without distinction all those living under its
sway; even foreigners, during their residence, are the temporary
subjects of the laws of the State. To inhabit its territory is to sub
mit to its sovereignty.
Whatever is not contrary to legislation is licit. But whatever
conforms to it is not always morally honest; for legislation is more
concerned with society's political welfare than with men's moral
perfection.
2a Portalis' metaphor suggests that law (droit) points the directions that
moral behavior should take. Legislation (les lois) defines the limits of conduct
which society permits or demands.
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... Judicial power, established to apply the laws, needs to be
guided in this application by certain rules. We have defined them:
laws are such that a man's private reason cannot preva il over the
law, which is public reason.

CONCLUSION
"I was correct in designating Portalis as the father of the civil

Code."2' Invested with the confidence and esteem of Napoleon,
Portalis died in August 1807 at the age of 61. ·The Empire was
then at the peak of its glory and spared one of its most outstanding
servants the pains and sufferings of the mistakes and disasters of
the second half of its existence. The spiritual father of the Civil
Code had deserved well of France and the w orld.
2• Capitant, Portalis, le Pere du Code Civil 56 Rev
crit leg J0ur 187, 199
•
(1936).
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